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Mijnheer de Rector Magnificus, 
Dames en Heren,
i  Crisis of Confidence
Is it still safe toeat farmed salmon?'After mad cows and dioxin chick- 
en we are now confronted with contaminated salmon. Whom should 
we trust? American and Canadian scientists who, on the basis of a 
recent study,’ claim that farmed salmon contains potentially hazardous 
levels of dioxins and PCBs?3 Or, should we believe French,a British5 and 
Dutch6 scientists who argue that the available data does not raise any 
newfood safety concerns?7 Th is involves questions of how much weight 
we attach to the relevant scientific studies and how much confidence 
we have in the correctness of scientific studies and of regulatory deci- 
sions subsequently adopted.
In the past fewyears, public trust has been undermined by several 
food scandals. In particular.the BSES crisis of 1996 led to a severe crisis of 
public confidence in both scientific advice and in the management of 
risks by the EU authorities. This crisis provided a classic illustration of 
uncertainty in Science and of the complex and vital relationship
1 Financial Times.'How fish farming could feed the world', 13 January 2004.
2 R. Hites et al., 'Global Assessment of Organic Contaminants in Farmed 
Salmon', 303 Science 2004, p. 226-229.
3 Polychlorinated Biphenyls.
4 <http://www.afssa.fr/ftp/afssa/actu/communique_saumon.pdf>.
5 <http://www.foodstandards.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/ 
sciencestudysalmonx
6 <http://www.vwa.nl>; archives of 13 January 2004.
7 The British Food Standards Agency explains this divergence by the different 
approaches to setting guideline safety levels taken by, on the one hand, the 
US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and, on the other, bodies such as 
the US Food and Drug Administration, the World Health Organization, the 
Scientific Committee on Food, that advised the European Commission, and 
the UK Committee on Toxicity.
See <http://www.foodstandards.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/scienceriskdioxins>. 
In his speech before the European Parliament of 10 February 2004, European 
Commissioner for Health and Consumer Protection, D. Byrne commented 
that although the American study did not raise new food safety issues, the 
presence of the contaminants was a cause for concern, see SPEECH/04/69.
8 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy.
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between Science and society. It put the spotlight on a series of severe 
institutional shortcomings in EU policies on risk.9 A flood of contradicto- 
ry and often incomplete information amplified the fears of European 
citizens.
All these concerns make up part of what we may call a 'paradox of 
progress'. On the one hand, due to progress in Science and technology, 
the agro-food sector must respect ever-stricter standards, quality con- 
trol and monitoring procedures. On the other hand, paradoxically, over 
the past decade there has also been an increasing number of food-safe- 
ty alerts, such as BSE, dioxin, listeria and salmonella.'0 Both regulators 
and the general public have consequently become increasingly aware of 
the risks that are intrinsic to the food industry. In addition, the continu- 
ous stretching of the frontiers of Science in areas such as biotechnology 
raises anxiety among the public." As a result, the general loss of confi­
dence has led to a decrease in the perceived authority of Science and to 
an erosion of the credibility and legitimacy of public decision-makers.,!
According to a European survey on biotechnology, in 2002 scientists 
still enjoyed the trust of European citizens. Yet, the same survey shows 
that only half of the Europeans consulted are interested in Science and 
many of them consider themselves to be poorly informed.’5 Moreover, a 
decline in public trust of governments and politicians can be observed. 
This confirms that the problem of confidence is not confined to the EU, 
but also pertains to national institutions. Less than 5 0 %  of the
9 Report of the Temporary Committee of Inquiry into BSE, set up by the 
Parliament in July 1996,00 the aileged contraventions or mal-administration 
in the implementation of Community law in relation to BSE, without preju- 
dice to the jurisdiction of the Community and the national courts of 7 
February 1997, A4-0020/97 (Rapporteur Ortega).
10 See The Paradox o f Progress, European Research 2002, 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/research/fp6/pdf/food_en.pdf>.
11 UK House of Lords, Select Committee on Science and Technology, 3rd report 
1999-2000,23 February 2000, summary, <http://www.publications. 
p arliam ent.u k/p a/ld 19 990 0/ld select/ld sctech/38/38 01.htm >; B. Wynne, 
(2000)'Public Participation in'Scientific Issues’: what is the recent fuss about 
and how should we address it?', British Council lecture, 10 October 2000.
12 With regard to risk perception, see, inter alia, P. Slovic, (Ed.), The Perception of 
Risk (london, Earthscan, 2000) and N. Pidgeon, R.E. Kasperson, P. Slovic, The 
Social Amplification o f Risk (Cambridge, Cambridge llniversity Press, 2003).
13 Europeans and Biotechnology, Eurobarometer, nr. 58, second edition, March 2003, 
p. 28, <http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_177_en.pdf>.
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Europeans consulted have confidence in their own government and in 
industry in relation to biotechnology.''’ It is interesting to note that there 
is more confidence in the European Commission than in national gov- 
ernments.’5 The most recent generai EU public opinion analysis shows, 
however, that in 2003 the confidence rating for the European 
Commission, the European Parliament and the Council has continued to 
decline.'6 These figures indicate that much must stil) be do'ne to build 
public trust in the EU regulators. Clearly, the confidence problem is also 
a reflection of more generai concerns as to the legitimacy and account- 
ability of the EU and its law-making powers, due to the pervasiveness of 
EU integratión in many fields.'7 General problems relate to the feeling 
that there is a lack of involvement in major decisions, a low level of 
understanding of how the EU functions and a weak acceptance of the 
system as such.'8
Not only citizens, but also Member States often voice explicit distrust 
towards the European Union. Confidence problems are expressed in the 
fact that Member States are increasingly willing to ignore or to disagree 
with EU legislation.Thus, a trend may be observed in that Member States 
increasingly want to opt out of the Community’s harmonisation meas- 
ures in the field of health and safety and environmental protection and 
set higher levels of protection for their own citizens.'9 In addition, more
14 Ibid, p. 31-32. See also the UK Select Committee on Science and Technology, 
which identified, on the basis of survey data, that negative responses to 
Science associated with Government or industry are expressed as a lack of 
trust, supra note 11.
15 It is not surprising that there is more confidence in university scientists than 
in scientists working for industry (with confidence surpluses of 7 6 %  and 56% 
respectively). Europeans and Biotechnology, ibid.
16 Eurobarometer 60, Autumn 2003, First results, p. 6. See 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb6o/eb6o_en.pdf.
17 See for recent examples, D. Wincott and A M . Arnull (Eds.), Accountability and 
Legitimacy in the European Union (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002) and K. 
Lenaerts and M. Desomer/New Models of Constitution-making in the Europe: 
the Quest for Legitimacy', 39(6) Common Market Law Review 2002, p. 1217-1253.
18 See E. Best, ‘Transparency and European Governance: Clearly not a simple 
matter’, in: V. Deckmyn (Ed.), increasing Transparency in the European Union? 
(Maastricht, EIPA, 2002), p. 93.
19 See for an analysis, N. de Sadeleer, 'Procedures for Derogations from the 
Principle of Approximation of Laws under Article 95 EC', 40(4) Common Market 
Law Review 2003, p. 889-915. See also J. Zander,'The Green Guarantee in the EC 
Treaty: Two recent cases', 16(1) Journal of Environmental Law 2004, p. 65-79.
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and more often Member States are hesitant to adhere to Community 
norms. Let me briefly illustrate this with two concrete examples.
First, 1 would like to recall the refusal of France to implement the 
Commission’s decision of 1999 to lift the embargo on the export of 
British beef.10 This decision had been based on the positive opinion of 
the Community's Scientific Steering Committee regarding the safety of 
British beef. In order to justify its refusal, France invoked the scientific 
opinion of its own food safety agency, l'Agence Francaise Sécurité 
Sanitaire' d e ? Afiments.1' This agency held that serious doubts still 
remained as to the risks presented by British beef. The European Court 
of Justice, however, elegantly avoided taking this argument into account 
on procedural grounds. It condemned such behaviour by France and 
forced France to comply with the Commission's decision and hence, lift 
the ban. At the same time, however, it underlined the necessity for a 
Europeanisation of beef traceability systems in the absence of which 
France, in some cases, was allowed to block British beef from entering its 
market in order to protect human health.”
Second, Austria, Luxembourg and Italy haveopenly refused to comply 
with Community legislation on genetically modified organisms (GMOs) 
and novel food. Austria and Luxembourg have denied access of GM 
maize products onto their markets, notwithstanding the fact that the 
'marketing of these products had been authorised by the Com m ission/5
20 Commission Decision 1999/514/EC setting the date on which dispatch from 
the United Kingdom of bovine products under the date-based export sche- 
me may commence by virtue of Article 6(5) of Council Decision 98/256/EC 
(notified under document number 0(1999) 2500), (1999) OJ L 195/42).
21 Loi 98-535 du ler juillet 1998 relative a la veille sanitaire et la surveillance des 
produits destinés a l'homme. Website: <http://www.afssa.fr/>.
22 Case C-1/00, Commission v. France, [2001] ECR I-9989.
23 In spite of many objections raised by several Member States, the Commission 
had approved four GM maize products and one swede rape product. See 
Commission Decision 97/98/EC concerning herbicide-tolerant GM maize 
produced by Ciba-Geigy (now Novartis), (1997) OJ L 31/69; Commission 
Decision 98/292/EC concerning grains of GM maize produced by Novartis, 
(1998) OJ L 131/28; Commission Decision 98/293/EC concerning seeds and 
grains of GM maize produced by AgrEvo, (1998) OJ L 131/30; Commission 
Decision 98/294/EC concerning herbicide-tolerant GM maize produced by 
Monsanto, (1998) OJ L 131/32 and Commission Decision 98/291/EC concerning 
GM spring swede rapes produced by AgrEvo, (1998) OJ L 131/26.
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Italy used the safeguard clause of the Novel Food Regulation to suspend 
the trade and use of all products derived from GM maize.M In a prelimi- 
nary ruling, the European Court of Justice recently recognised the power 
of Member States to adopt diverging, protective measures, on the basis 
of the preca.utfonary principle, if such measures are necessary to protect 
human health and safety.’5
This lack of trust underlies some of the most pressing tensions in the 
governance of the internal market^of the EU, namely: the inereasing 
divergence between scientific opinion and public opinion, the continu- 
ously conflicting scientific opinions of Compiurrity, national and inter­
national bodiesand.closely linked to this, the increasingly differing posi- 
tions of Member State and Community authorities. These tensions 
indicate that the often ad-hoc methods and procedures, by means of 
which the EU has traditionally dealt with sociaJIy sensitive and scientif- 
icaliy complex issues, are inadequate, and that the Europèan integration 
process is endangered.This calls for regulatory reform.The central ques- 
tion is how to improve the credibility of the EU regulatory structures 
that govern mad cows, dioxin chicken and contaminated salmon?
2 The Need for an Overarching Approach to Risk Regulation
Before examining this question, let me briefly explain the complexi- 
ties of risk regulation. According to the German sociologist Ulrich Beek, 
modern society is no longer preoccupied with the distribution of 
wealth, and the division of society along classes, but is increasingly con- 
cerned with the distribution of risk. Modern society has'thus trans- 
formed into a 'risk society'.’6 In pursuing its objectives of creating an 
internal market on which products freely circulate, as well as of protect- 
ing human health and safety,the EU is nowalso increa'singly faced with 
the concerns of today's risk society. The regulatory activities of the 'risk
24 The Italian Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers of 4 August 
2000 on the precautionary suspension of the trade in and use of certain 
transgenic products within national territory under Article 12 of Regulation 
No 258/97 (GURI No 184 of 8 August 2000, p. 9).
25 Case C-236/01, Monsanto Agricoltura Italia SpA and Others v. Presidenza del 
Consiglio dei Ministri and Others, not yet reported, para. 114. In those cases 
Member States must nevertheless first carry out a risk assessment 'which is 
as complete as possible given the particular circumstances of the case'.
26 U. Beek, Risikogesellschaft, A u f dem Weg in eine andere Moderne (Frankfurt 
a.M„ Suhrkamp Verlag, 1986).
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society' involve risk assessment, risk management and risk communica- 
tion. Risk assessment refers to the evaluation of the risks associated 
with specific substances or products. Risk management concerns the 
regulatory decisions on what to do about these risks. Risk communica- 
tion refers to the process of informing the public of both scientific find- 
ings and regulatory decisions.
In many fields, it is currently the EU that has to determine whether a 
product's attendant risks are judged to be 'acceptable'.17 This requires 
the EU to rank norms or values and to balance competing factors such 
as safety and economic competitiveness. Yet, such decisions are often 
presented by decision-makers as stemming only from ‘sound Science’. 
This strong reliance on Science may be argued to result in an increasing 
scientification of politics. Where the uncertainty of scientific knowledge 
is increasingly recognised, this leads, paradoxically, to the politicisation 
of Science.18 In the face of scientific uncertainty, scientists cannot and 
will not limit themselves to addressing 'purely scientific issues'.’9 Not 
surprisingly, voices are heard calling for participation of the stakehold- 
ers and/or laypersons in the formulation of scientific opinions.J“ Also, 
the proper application of and compliance with EU legislation are essen- 
tial to create a climate of trust. Both Member States and citizens should 
be able to rely on the fact that the law will be enforced fairly.J’
This will be even more important in the post-enlargement situation. 
Food safety, for example, is of major concern for the upcoming enlarge- 
ment. Many of the new EU countries will not have complied with the EU 
food safety requirements by the time they join the EU on 1 May 2004.i!
27 See W. Lowrance, O f Acceptable Risk: Science and the Determination o f Safety 
(Los Altos, CA.W illiam  Kaufmann Inc., 1976).
28 See P. Weingart.'Scientific expertise and political accountability: paradoxes of 
Science in politics', 26(3) Science and Public Policy 1999, p. 151-161.
29 S. Jasanoff, The Fifth Branche: Science Advisors as Policy Makers (Cambridge 
MA, Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 249.
30 See e.g. B. Wynne/May the Sheep Safely Graze: a Reflexive View of the Expert-Lay 
Knowledge Divide', in: S. Lash, B. Szerszynski and B. Wynne (Eds.), Risk, 
Environment and Modernity: Towards a New Ecology (London, Sage, 1996), 44-83.
31 See, inter alia, Commission Com m unication Better M onitoring of the 
Application of Community Law, COM(2002) 725 final.
32 D. Byrne, European Commissioner for Health and Consumer Protection, 
Enlargement, Food Imports and Rural Development, speech before the EEP 
Seminar in Brussels, 10 December 2003, SPEECH/03/606.
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Clearly, however, the level of food safety can and should not be compro- 
mised. Under the Accession Treaty, the Commission has the power to take 
appropriate measures should these countries fail to implement 
Community obligations and thus, put the proper functioning of the inter- 
nal market at risk.53 Recently, Commissioner Byrne nevertheless stressed 
that ‘it is in everypne's interest to avoid the use of such measures'.34
It will also be very likely that the current Member States will resort to 
safeguard clauses laid down in specific directives or to the opt-out pro­
cedure laid down in the Treaty.35 Safeguard clauses enable Member 
States to temporarily block the free movement of foodstuffs originating 
in other Member States if they endanger human health or safety. The 
opt-out procedure allows Member States to deviate, under certain con- 
ditions, from the Community’s harmonisation measures if this is neces- 
sary to protect human health.36 This could lead to a Europe of two, or 
even more, speeds, as is actually favoured by the President of the 
Commission Romano Prodi, but very much opposed by the Prime 
Minister of Ireland who now holds the EU Presidency.” Does this mean
33 Article 38 of the Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Czech 
Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of 
Latvia, the Republic of Uthuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of 
Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak 
Republic and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the European Union 
is founded, (2003) OJ L236/33.
34 D. Byrne, supra note 32. In the newsletter Consum er Voice of DG SANCO of 
April 2004, however, the Commission re-assures that ‘EU newcomers comply 
with food safety standards’. Nevertheless it is doubtful whether this will be 
the case in practice since many new Member States arg likely to have pro- 
blems when they apply the rules. See A. Surdej.'Enlarging the EU Food Safety 
Regime: Selected Problems in Adjusting the Polish Food Safety Regime to EU 
Food Safety Requirements’, in: G. Majone (ed.) Risk Regulation in the European 
Union: Between Eniargment and Internationalisation (Florence, EUI/RSCAS, 
2003), p. 188.
35 Article 95 (4-9) EC.
36 See J. Scott and E. Vos,'The Juridification of Uncertainty: Observations on the 
Ambivalence of the Precautionary Principle within the EU and the WTO’, in 
Chr. Joerges and R. Dehousse, Cood Covernance in Europe's IntegratedMarket 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 267-273 and N. de Sadeleer, supra 
note19.
37 See Press Release from the Irish Presidency of 4 January 2004, 'Ahern says 
"the best way that Europe operates is moving together"’, 
<http://www.eu2004.ie/tem plates/news.asp?sNavlocator=66&listJd=8>.
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that the enlarged European Union will grow into a 'European Onion’ 
with different layers of measures applicable to various Member States?*8
Ladies and gentlemen, it is clear that these matters need to be 
addressed by means of a comprehensive and integrated approach to 
food safety. This does not mea'n that the EU should be exclusively 
responsible for all aspects of food safety. However, it demands that all 
aspects of food safety are addressed at the EU level, requiring an appro- 
priate concept of shared responsibility.59 If we do not want the Lisbon 
objective of becoming the most competitive and dynamic knowledge- 
based economy by 2010 to remain an 'EU-topia', it is clear that many 
problems are still to be tackled in this area.
These problems can roughly be divided into institutional and sub- 
stantive issues of a more general nature and issues, which relate to risk 
regulation more specifically. I would like to share with you the most 
important ones.
On an institutional level, questions arise as to competence and multi- 
level governance. For example, which authority should regulate: the 
European Parliament and the Council.the Commission possibly togeth- 
er with comitology committees, or a separate European agency? This 
question is closely linked with the question of separation and delega- 
tion of powers. What should bethe institutional arrangements (such as 
the composition of committees or agencies) in view of the enlarge- 
ment? Moreover, questions concerning legitimacy and good governance 
exist, while the quality of EU legislation, as well as its implementation, 
compliance and enforcement, are also problematic. Recently it appeared 
that countries, includingThe Netherlands, have an ever-increasing back- 
log of EU directives awaiting implementation.40
38 See E. Vos.'Differentiation, Harmonisation and Covernance', in B. de Witte, D. 
Hanf en E. Vos (Eds.), The M any Faces o f Differentiation in EU Law  (Antwerp, 
intersentia Publishing, 2001), p. 177.
39 See the Commission in its White Paper on Food Safety, COM(i999) 719 final.
40 See Press Releasefrom DG Internal Market of 12 January 2004,'Internal Market: 
big disparities between Member States in implementing and applying rules', 
IP/04/33. See also the Internal Market Scoreboard Nr. 12 of 5 May 2003, 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/update/score/score12/ 
scorei2-text_en.pdf> and the Commission Report on the Implementation of 
the internal Market Strategy (2003-2006), C0M (2OO4) 22 final.
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On a substantive level, difficulties arise with regard to the inter-rela- 
tionship and compatibility of EU policies. Food safety regulation touch­
es u pon, for instance, Health and safety protection, internal market, agri- 
culture and external relations, and in particular WTO law. How can both 
thefree movement of goods and human health protection be ensured? 
How is compliance with in te rn a tio n a l o b lig a tio n s g u a ra n te e d ? An ex ce l­
lent example of this difficulty is, of course, the dispute between the US 
and the EU on genetically modified organisms.4’
Ouestions that relate more specifically to risk regulation are the 
manner in which Science is developed and how the Community should 
deal with scientific uncertainty. In addition it is asked how it should 
define what risks are acceptable and how such risks should be commu- 
nicated. Here, the application of the precautionary principle is of para- 
mount importance. On the basis of this principle, regulators may take 
protective measures although scientific evidence on the risk or on the 
causal relation between the risk and the damage is lacking.4’ Closely 
linked hereto, and of additional importance, are issues relating to the 
incorporation of public concerns and communication of the results in 
risk assessment and risk management and the role of the institutions 
involved therein. Other problems relate to the question of whether risk 
assessment and risk management should be separated.
Thus, in order to restore public confidence in risk regulation and 
enhance legitimacy, several avenues may be explored.These avenues all 
relate to the ‘new governance thinking'.45 This thinking is expressed, 
inter alia, in the perspectives on multi-level networks, the role of inde­
pendent agencies and deliberative democracy. Key elements of gover­
nance or better, good governance, are transparency, public participation 
and accountability. Not surprisingly these elements form a prominent 
part of the European Com m ission’s W hite Paper on European
41 Ongoing disputes before the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO initiated 
by the US, Canada and Argentina: W T/D S291/23, W T/D S292/17 and 
WT/DS293/17.
42 See for an overview of the legal debate on the precautionary principle: M. 
Faure and E. Vos (Eds.) Juridische afbakening van het voorzorgsbeginsel: moge­
lijkheden en grenzen (Den Haag, Gezondheidsraad, 2003). Available at 
<http://www.gr.nl/pdf.php?!D=723>.
43 See J. Scott and D. Trubek, 'Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to 
Governance in the European Union’, 8(i) European Law Journal 2002, p. 1-18.
Overcoming the Crisis o f Confidence
Governance o fJuly  2001.44 The use of independent agencies is generally 
advocated to generate greater regulatory credibility as it may ensure 
more transparency and accountability.4S
I have tried to show that regulating food safety and, more generally, 
risk, clearly is an extremely complicated and interdisciplinary undertak- 
ing. it provides us.fortunate researchers, with a challenging and exciting 
research agenda. Several of these issues will therefore form part of the 
researcl\and teaching activities I would like to pursue in the coming 
years. You will understand that today I will not discuss all these ele- 
ments. By way of example, I will explore some of the initiatives by means 
of which the European institutions, in particular the Commission, have 
attempted to overcome the crisis of confidence and more generally the 
legitimacy problem: namely, by putting in place principles of good gov- 
ernance.
3 Enhancing Credibility by M eans of Principles of Good Governance
In a speech before the European Parliament in 2000, Romani Prodi 
observed on the one hand, the success of European integration and the 
internal market, enabling the EU to emerge as a world economic power 
capable of meeting the challenges of globalisation and on the other, the 
loss of faith of Europe's citizens in the European institutions.46 The 
European Commission has therefore looked for a new balance between 
action by the Commission, the other Community institutions, the 
Member States and civil society.47 In its White Paper on European 
Governance, the Commission recognises that 'people increasingly distrust 
institutions and politics or are simply not interested in them', and that this 
problem ‘is particularly acute at the EU level'. It believes that 'many people 
are losing confidence in a poorly understood and complex system’.48
44 White Paper on European Governance, C0M (2ooi) 428 final.
45 See G. Majone,‘The Credibility Crisis of Community Regulation', 38(2) Journal 
o/Com m on Market Studies 2000, p. 273-302.
46 R. Prodi, President of the European Commission 2000-2005, Shaping the New  
Europe, speech before the European Parliament, 15 February 2000, 
Strasbourg, SPEECH/oo/4i.
47 Commission Communication, Strategie objectives 2000-2005 ‘Shaping the 
New Europe', COM (2000) 154 final, p. 5.
48 White Paper on European Governance, supra note 44, p. 3.
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The Commission explains thedissatisfaction with EU policies and the 
functioning of the institutions, inter alia, by the perceived inability of 
the EU to act effectively in situations of food scares. it complains that 
part of the distrust is also due to the fact that Member States often 
blame ‘Brussels’ for unpopular decisions, although these decisions have 
been taken in agreement with, or even upon request of, these Member 
States. It teils us that 'the EU is often seen as remote and at the same 
time too intrusive’,49 The Commission recognises that people should be 
given a greater say in the way Europe is run. It therefore seeks new 
means to improve governance and proposes to open up the policy-mak- 
ing process to get more people and organisations involved in shaping 
and delivering EU policy. It promotesfive principles as principles of good 
governance: openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and 
coherence. These principles are, in its view, 'important for establishing 
more democratic governance'.50
Allow me to briefly draw upon some of the initiatives the institutions 
have undertaken with regard to two of these principles that are gener- 
ally considered to be essential to generate public trust in risk regulation: 
openness and participation.5'
Openness and Transparency
The BSE crisis has taught us that openness and transparency in both 
decision-making and the formulation of scientific advice is of para- 
mount importance. This was not only stressed in 1997 by the European 
Parliament Inquiry Committee on BSE,S’ but was also more recently 
underlined by the British Inquiry Committee on BSE in the UK.5J Drawing 
lessons from the UK BSE crisis, the latter Committee tells us that open­
ness also requires recognition of uncertainty, where it exists. Although 
regulators generally fear that this kind of openness would create an
49 Ibid, p. 5.
50 Ibid, p. io.
51 See P. Harremoës et al. (Eds.), The Precautionary Principle in the 2oth Century: 
Late Lessons from  Early Warnings (London, Earthscan, 2002), p. 216-217.
52 Report of the Temporary Committee of Inquiry into BSE, supra note 9.
53 The so called Phillips Report, published as a Return to an Order of the 
Honourable the House of Com m ons dated October 2000 for the Report, evi- 
dence and supporting papers of the Inquiry into the emergence and Identifi­
cation of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) and variant Creutzfeldt- 
Jakob Disease (vCJD) and the action taken in response to it up to 20 March 
1996, <http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/report/index.htm>.
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irrationa! reaction by the public and increasefears and distrust, it is sug- 
gested that the public should be trusted to respond rationally to open- 
ness. The Committee recommends that scientific investigation of risk 
should be open and transparent, and that the advice and the reasoning 
of advisory committees should be made public.54
Following the 1996 BSE crisis the Community institutions were 
indeed quick to improve transparency of both decision-making and Sci­
ence in the hope of restoring the citizens' confidence in European regu­
lation.ssThe Commission first carried out a radical restructuring of all its 
departments by transferring the responsibility for decision-making 
involving human health and safety to the Directorate General Health 
and Consumer Protection. Subsequently, it proclaimed that it would 
develop a new approach to food safety based,interalia,on  greater trans­
parency and information throughout the decision-making process and 
inspection.56
At the same time, the institutions have facilitated access to their doc- 
uments, in all policy fields.” Transparency has, since many years, ranked 
highly on the political agenda. The Treaty of Amsterdam introduced a 
right of access to documents of the Council, the Commission and the 
European Parliament58 and required transparency in decision-making.59 
Unsurprisingly; the European Convention has also put great weight on 
transparency and has further developed it. Consequently, '[i]n order to 
promote good governance and ensure the participation of civil society’, 
the Dra ft Constitution explicitly requires that ‘the Union Institutions, 
bodies and agencies shall conduct their work as openly as possible'.60
54 Ibid.
55 See for an analysis of the new approach tofood safety, E. Vos, 'EU Food Safety 
Regulation in the Aftermath of the BSE Crisis', 23(3) Journal o f Consumer Policy 
2000, p. 227-255. See more recently, D. Chalmers, ‘“Food for Thought", 
Reconciling European Risks and Traditional Ways of Life', 66(4) Modern Law 
Review 2003, p. 533-562.
56 Green Paper on the General Principles of Food Law in the European Union, 
COM (1997) 176 final.
57 D. Curtin ,‘"Citizens"fundamental right of access to EU information: An evol- 
ving digital passepartout?’, 37(1) Common Market Law Review 2000, p. 7-41.
58 Article 255 EC.
59 Article i EU.
60 Article 49 of the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, CONV 
850/03.
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Notably, the institutions have paid particuiar attention to ensuring 
more transparency in the way scientific advice is constructed. The New 
Approach to Food Safety, for instance, introduced in 1997 - in addition to 
the principles of excellence and independence - the principle of trans­
parency, to govern the then-existing scientific committees.6' As these 
measures proved still insufficiënt to restore public confidence,61 a more 
conceptual approach to food safety was adopted in 1999, called 'From 
Farm toTable'or'From the Farm tothe Fork'.6j In 2002, basedpn this new 
policy, a Food Regulation was adopted with a new framework for food- 
stuffs.64 The new food law establishes the requirement, as part of the 
legislativeframework, that risk assessments should be undertaken in an 
independent, objective and transparent manner, on the basis of the 
available scientific Information and data. An important development, 
with a view to fulfilling this aim, has been the establishment of the 
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA).65
This agency has been central in the Commission’s strategy to restore 
consumer confidence.66 By means of this agency, transparency is pro- 
moted whilst at the same time the independence and quality of scien­
tific advice is also enhanced. Significantly, the EFSA must immediately 
make its findings public concerning risks to European consumers.6’ 
Transparency, with respect to this issue, also includes the ease of access
61 Green Paper on Consumer Health and Food Safety, COM (1997) 183 final.
62 Subsequent scares of food safety (in particular concerning dioxin contami- 
nation) increased public awareness and undermined even further the confi­
dence of consumers in the capacity of the food industry (in its broadest 
sense) and the public authorities to ensure that their food is safe even, as 
Commissioner Byrne admitted in 1999. D. Byrne, Commissioner DG Health 
and Consumer Protection, Food Safety in Europe in hts speech for the Arthur 
Cox Conference on Food Law, 5 November 1999, Dublin, SPEECH/99/156.
63 White Paper on Food Safety, COM (1999) 719 final.
64 Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of 28 January 2002 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council laying down the general principles and requirements of 
food law, establishing the European Food SafetyAuthority and laying down 
procedures in matters of food safety, (2002) OJ L 31/1.
65 Article 22 of Regulation (EC) No 178/2002, supra note 64.
^ 6 6  See Commissioner D. Byrne at <http://europa.eu.int/com m /com m issio- 
ners/byrne/key-issues_en.htm#EFA>.
67 Article 40 of Regulation (EC) No 178/2002, supra note 64.
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to information on the activities of the EF5A and its committees.65 Thus, 
the EFSA is required to make public: the agendas of the meetings; the 
list of members; the opinions of the scientific committees65 (including 
minority opinions); and its annual reports. In addition, it must publish 
the annual declarations of interest of all persons involved in the activi­
ties of the EFSA (the members of the Management Board, the members 
of the Advisory Forum, the Executive Director, the members of the 
Scientific Committee and the Scientific Panels) indicating any direct or 
indirect interests that could be considered harmful to their independ- 
ence.70 In this, much use is made of the Internet, which, of course, is an 
important element in achieving more open and public risk regulation.7’
Participation
Openness is a precondition for participation and accountability. 
Participation in both decision-making and Science as a means to regain 
trust is promoted in several studies and documents.7' An important 
stu d y drawing on 14 ca se -stu d ie s, among w h ich  BSE, benzene, hor- 
mones and asbestos, reveals that involving a wide range of stakehold- 
ers, and taking account of their values and interests at the earliest stage 
of regulatory appraisal and choice of technological and social options, 
brings several benefits. First, this would augment the information avail- 
able for policy-making. Second, this may also improve public trust in 
society's capacity to control hazards, without necessarily stifling innova- 
tion or compromising Science. Moreover the study suggests that it may 
also make better Science.” Opening up the traditionally closed circles of
68 Subsequently laid down in Commission Decision 97/579/EC, (1997) OJ L 
237/18. Commission Decision 97/404/EC setting up a Scientific Steering 
Committee, (1997) OJ L 169/85.
69 The existing scientific committees in the food sector have now been absor- 
bed into the EFSA.
70 Articles 37 and 38 of Regulation (EC) No 178/2002, supra note 64.
71 Website: <http://www.efsa.eu.int>.
72 See, inter alia, Report of the Working Group 'Democratising expertise and esta- 
blishing scientific reference systems’ (Group 1b), (rapporteur Liberatore), 
European Commission, 2001,
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/governance/areas/group2/report_en.pdf> and the 
Conclusionsof the Conference'Science and Governance in a Knowledge Society: 
the Challenge for Europe', organised by DG Joint Research Centre and DG 
Research, Brussels, 16-17 October 2000, p. 2,
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/governance/areas/group2/contribution_en.pdf>.
73 P. Harremoës et al. (Eds.), supra note 51, p. 217.
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science, by aliowing interested parties to participate is, nevertheless, stiil 
quite revolutionary, even in national contexts."
Also according to the Commission ‘improved participation is likely to 
create more confidence in the end result and in the institutions which 
deliver policies'.” To this end, it has adopted a general strategy that 
envisages increased and more active dialogue with civil society.76 In 
December 2002, it ad.opted a set of minimum standards for its consul- 
tation processes of external parties.77 In addition, the Commission 
emphasises, in its Action Plan on Science and Society,78 the need for a 
dialogue involving close co-operation between a wide range of stake- 
holders in science policies. Such stakeholders should come from 
research organisations, public authorities, media, citizens, civil society 
and enterprises. The Commission recognises that the input of the pub­
lic in policy debates may disclose relevant knowledge, values or ques- 
tions, which scientists have neglected. The Commission points, in this 
context, to innovative institutional participatory arrangements under- 
taken in the national contexts, such as consensus conferences, citizens’ 
juries, national and regional consultations, on-line fora and participative 
foresight programmes.79
Several steps have already been taken to involve interested parties in 
the activities of the scientific advisors to the Commission. Interested 
parties may, for example.comment on various opinions of the European 
Food Safety Authority and other scientific committees. Furthermore in 
accordance with its mandate,80 the EFSA has, very recently, agreed to
74 R. Bal, W. Bijker en R. Hendriks, Paradox van Wetenschappelijk Gezag: Over de 
Maatschappelijke Invloed van Adviezen van de Gezondheidsraad, 1985 - 2001 
(Den Haag, Gezondheidsraad, 2002), p. 312.
75 White Paper on European Governance, supra note 44, p. 7. See also the Report 
of the Working Group ‘Democratising expertise and establishing scientific 
reference systems’, supra note 72.
76 White Paper on European Governance, ibid, p. 16.
77 Commission Communication, 'Towards a reinforced culture of consultation 
and dialogue - General Principles and M inim um  Standards for consultation 
of interested parties by the Commission', COM (2002) 704 final.
78 European Commission, Science and Society Action Plan (Brussels, 2002), p. 14, 
available at
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/research/science-society/pdf/ss_ap_en.pdf>.
79 Ibid.
80 Article 42 of Regulation (EC) No 178/2002, supra note 64.
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open up its w o rk fu rth e rto  p u b lic  scru tin y .T h is  w ill entaW ,inter a lia ,t h a t  
the A u th o rity  w ill a llo w  c o n su m e rs and  o th er stak e h o ld e rs to  be 
involved in its work, by m e an s o f the creation o f a stakeh o ld er forum , 
and explore th e  p o ss ib ility  o f h a v in g  p u b lic  h e a rin g s on s ig n ifica n t 
sc ie n tific  issu e s.8' Im p ortantly, p a rticip a tio n  o f interested p arties is also 
recognised by th e  v e ry ^ o m p o sit io n  o f its M a n a g e m e n t Board in c lu d in g  
fo ur m e m b e fs 'w ith  a b ackground  in o rg a n isa tio n s  rep resen ting  co n ­
su m e rs a n d  o ther interests in the food ind u stry.81 In ad d itio n , the  EFSA is 
required to prom ote the  n etw o rk in g  o f o rg a n isa tio n s  o p eratin g  in the 
sam e  fie ld  as th e  EFSA itse lf in order to  fa c ilita te  a sc ie n tific  cooperation 
fra m ew o rk .83
Th e C o m m iss io n  also en co u rag es th e  s e ttin g -u p  o f in fo rm a l net- 
works, b rin g in g  to g e th e r European d e cis io n -m a ke rs, a cad em ics, experts 
and stakeholders, to  prom ote d ia lo g u e  and in te ractio n .84 Furtherm ore, it 
has becom e m ore active in la u n ch in g  variou s w id er co n su lta tio n s 
a n n o u n c in g  its policy in itia tiv e s in va rio u s fie lds. It n ia kes m ore use of 
green and  w h ite  papers, w h ils t  it a lso  uses se e m in g ly  new  in stru m e n ts  
like reflection papers and d iscu ssio n  papers.85 In th is  context it is in te r- 
e stin g  to observe th a t the C o m m iss io n  has set up an o p p o rtu n ity  for 
o n -lin e  c o n s u lta t io n ,‘Your Vo ice in Europe’.86 W ith in  th is  fram ew o rk, the 
C o m m iss io n  has la u n ch ed  several co n su lta tio n  procedures re latin g  to
81 EFSA Press Release of 3 December 2003, 'EFSA plans greater public involve- 
ment in its work’,
<http://www.efsa.eu.int/pdf/pressrel_mbon_final_en.pdf>.
82 Article 25 of Regulation (EC) No 178/2002, supra note 64.
83 Article 36 of Regulation (EC) No 178/2002, ibid.
84 In its Science and Society Action Plan, for example, the Commission explicit- 
ly mentions the TRUSTNET project which aims at analysing the factors that 
influence the credibility, effectiveness and legitimacy of the scientific and 
regulatory framework for hazardous activities, as well as developing more 
coherent,comprehensive and equitable approaches for assessing and mana- 
ging risks. See Science and Society Action Plan, supra note 78, p. 14.
85 With these new expressions, the Commission seemingly wants to suggest 
that these papers are truly meant for discussion. In contrast to the Green and 
White Papers, these documents are not official COM documents. See for an 
example of a discussion paper: Directorate General Health and Consumer 
Protection (SANCO D4), ‘Discussion Paper on the Im plem entation of 
Regulation (EC) No 258/97 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
27 January 1997 concerning novel foods and novel food ingredients', July 
2002,<http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/novel_food/discussion_en.pdf>.
86 <http://europa.eu.int/yourvoice/index_en.htm>.
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food safety.87 Interested parties have, for example, been able to com- 
ment on the im plem entation and working of the Novel Food 
Regulation.88 Other examples of public consultation are evident with 
respect to the White paper on European Governance itse lf5 and, of 
course, also the European Convention in the process of designing the 
draft Constitution.
That the EU is serious about the involvement of citizens is clear from 
the insertion of the principle of participatory democracy in the draft 
Constitution.90 This principle requires the institutionsrto give citizens 
and representative associations the opportunity to make known and 
publicly exchange their views on all areas of Union action. Moreover, it 
emphasises the need for regular consultations with concerned parties 
and frequent, transparent dialogue with representative associations 
and civil society.5'
4 Challenges for an Enlarged European Union
All these initiatives are, of course, laudable as they certainly con- 
tribute to more transparent and democratic risk regulation, and to 
restoring public trust and legitimacy in the EU. Sofar so good.These ini­
tiatives show however that there is not yet an overarching theoretical 
approach to openness, transparency and participation, and to risk gov­
ernance in general. Allow me to advance some critical remarks and 
remaining challenges.
It seems that the EU institutions and, in particular the Commission, 
favour what has been calied a 'mutual trust paradigm of risk gover­
nance'. This approach is characterised by a broad involvement of the 
stakeholders in the risk assessment and management process as well as 
in the justification of the hazardous activities.9' It entails that S c ie n c e  is
87 <http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/consultations/index_en.htm>.
88 Regulation (EC) No 258/97 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
27 January 1997 concerning novel foods and novel food ingredients, (1997) OJ 
L 43/1. See the Discussion Paper, supra note 85.
89 See e.g. C0M (2O O 2) 705, Report from the Com m ission on European 
Governance.
90 Article 45 of the Draft Constitution.
91 Article 46 of the Draft Constitution.
92 TRUSTNET, Work Program 1997-1999 - Opening a new perspective on Risk 
Governance, <http://www.trustnetgovernance.com>.
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no longer presented to the public as an exclusive determining factor in 
the decision making process. Expertise becomes pluralistic and available 
to all parties involved. At the same time however the Community insti­
tutions stress the importance of resorting to sound science. For example, 
the EFSA is required to deliver th e ‘best possible scientific opinions'.5iThis 
seems difficult to reconcile with a broad interpretation of openness.
Access to documents still seems to be problematic in view of the 
many exceptions to the right to access.9* Although the draft Constitution 
reinforces the right of access to documents by improving the wording of 
the provision laying down this right,95 several issues, such as the precise 
legal nature of the right of access to documents, remain unclear.
In contrast to the American ‘sunshine’ committees,96 the meetings of 
the EU scientific committees (and the comitology committees) are not 
open to the general public. Only the Management Board of the EFSA 
holds, as a general rule,91 its meetings in public and may authorise con­
sumer representatives or other interested parties to observe the pro- 
ceedings of some of the Authority’s activities.98
This illustrates that it is not clear what openness and transparency 
actually mean in the European Union context. Do we also need to open 
up meetings of the scientific experts? This may raise new dilemmas as 
it may lead to endless discussions of viewpoints and further politicisa- 
tion of science. As we have seen in the BSE crisis, scientists may, in polit- 
ically sensitive cases, be put under strong pölitical pressure.99 Experts in 
social studies of science thus point to the danger that completely open- 
ing up the procedure of formulating scientific advice may be counter- 
productive. In this way, too much pressure would be exerted by the
93 Article 23 of Regulation (EC) No. 178/2002, supra note 64.
94 See D. Curtin, supra note 57.
95 Article 49 {3) of the Draft Constitution, supra note 60.
96 See the US Freedom of Information Act (‘FOIA’), 5 U.S.C. § 552, The Federal 
Advisory Committee Act (FACA), 5 U.S.C. app. II and the Government in the 
Sunshine Act, codified primarily at 5 U.S.C. section 552b.
97 Unless, acting on a proposal from the Executive Director, it decides otherwi- 
se for specific administrative points of its agenda: Article 38(2) of Regulation 
(EC) No. 178/2002, supra note 64.
98 Ibid.
99 See Report of the Temporary Committee of Inquiry into BSE, supra note g.p.io.
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interested parties creating the risk of paralysing the process.’00 On the 
other hand, however, leaving the construction of sound Science to only 
certified experts may lead again to the technocratic approach we want 
to avoid.'0'
Furthermore, queries remain as to what form of participation should 
be required. An OECD study reveals that active participation is still rare 
within the OECD countries”1 Will this be any easier at the European 
level?’OJ Active participation raises problematic practical issues, such as, 
who should participate (stakeholders, civil society and/or the general 
public), how those participating should be defined and what represen- 
tativeness they should have. In fact, today the Commission's initiatives 
involve mostly broad consultation processes. With regard to more active 
participation, the Commission favours innovative institutional proce­
dures such as consensus conferences and citizen's juries. Consensus 
conferences are a form of dialogue between lay people and scientists. 
Contrary to the name, they usually spark a debate between experts and 
citizens on contentious or contested questions. Based on the exchange 
between the experts, the citizens are supposed to form a consensus 
opinion. The question remains as to how effective such participatory 
arrangements are at the national level and,thus,can be at the European 
level. Social scientific research reveals various challenges associated 
with participatory procedures, such as consensus conference and citizen 
juries.'04 Interdisciplinary research on this topic seems therefore needed.
100 See e.g. R. Bal, W. Bijker en R. Hendriks, supra note 74, p. 315.
101 Ibid.
102 See E. Best, supra note 18, p. 113. See OECD, Citizens as Partners. Information, 
Consultation and Public Participation in Policy-making (Paris, 2001).
103 See E. Best, supra note 18, p. 113.
104 See e.g., 0 . Renn.T. Webler, and P. Wiedemann, Fairness and competence in Citi­
zen participation. Evaluation models fo r  environmental discourse (London, 
Kluwer Academic Publishers 1995); R. Löfstedt,'The Roie of Trust in the North 
Blackforest; an evaluation of a citizen panel project, 10 Risk Health Safe 
Environment, 1999, p 10-30; B. Kasemir, J, Jager, C. Jaeger, and M.T. Gardner, 
Public Participation in Sustainability Science (Cambridge, Cam bridge 
University Press, 2003); M.B.A. van Asselt and N. Rijkens-Klomp,‘Look in the 
Mirror: Reflection on participation in Integrated Assessment from a metho- 
dological perspective’, 12 Clobal Environmental Change 2 0 0 2 ,107-180; M. van 
de Kerkhof, Debating climate change. A study on stakeholder participation in 
an integrated assessment o f long-term climate policy in the Netherlands, 
forthcoming.
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The Commission strongly emphasises the need for extensive consul- 
tations and dialogue, as does the principle of participatory democracy in 
the draft Constitution. However it may be asked what a true, and most 
importantly successful, dialogue with the citizens should look like. I real- 
ly wonder whether many of you, present here today, will have been 
aware that during the whole year of 2001 there was a public debate on 
biotechnology and food in The Netherlands.’05 It is doubtful that there 
will be any greater awareness at the EU level. Moreover, it is unsure 
whether such dialogue will be in any way effective for citizens of the 
acceding countries who have a completely different regulatory culture. 
Increased consultation and deliberation risk becoming ‘empty procedu- 
ralism'. In many cases, minority interests are'seldom aligned with each 
other and often, only the dominant interests are recognised. In those 
cases,deliberation is likely to become a hollow and lengthy procedure in 
which the participation of stakeholders is merely used as a justification 
rather than allowing for a genuine involvement in the decision-making 
process.'06 For example, according to the UK BSE Inquiry Committee.one 
of the major administrative weaknesses in the UK BSE affair was the 
lengthy consultation process used before any decision was adopted. 
These issues should therefore be carefully considered in the design of 
consultation procedures. In addition.one may wonder how the principle 
of participatory democracy, as laid down in the draft Constitution, will 
relate to the principle of representative democracy.
Without doubt, the EFSA will have a crucial role to play in restoring 
the trust of both citizens and regulators. It remains to be seen whether 
it will succeed.The tasks of the EFSA are limited to risk assessment, com- 
munication and the setting up of networks. Here it is important to 
observe that, in cases of diverging scientific opinions, the Authority is 
obliged to co-operate with the national bodies, to either resolve the con­
flict or to present a joint document clarifying the differences of opin- 
ion.’07 In situations where different methodologies or opposing data are 
used, however, such a joint document could be used to undermine the 
credibility of the other. Such a document could therefore highlight inter­
na I crises of sciences and provoke crises of confidence in scientific
105 See <http://w w w .m inlnv.nl/them a/biotech/pub liek/inftbpoo.htm >. The 
archives can be found at
<http://www.m inlnv.nl/thema/biotech/archtb200101a.htm >.
106 D. Chalmers,supra note 55, p. 552.
107 Article 30 (4) of Regulation (EC) No 178/2002, supra note 64.
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expectations,and,at the same time, promote beliefs in a zero-risk world. 
This, in turn, could affect confidence in the analytical rigour of the 
EFSA.'o8The BSE crisis has furthermore shown that the communication 
of risks to the public and the effective crisis management by the author- 
ities are essentiai to generate confidence. Much of the success and cred­
ibility of the Authority will therefore also depend on the role it will play 
in this context as well as the way in which it will involve the stakehold- 
ers and the regulatory authorities in its activities.
/
One may wonder whether the EFSA has sufficiënt powers in these 
areas. it has, for example, only an advisory role in crisis management. It 
has more independent powers with regard to risk communication. 
These independent powers are tempered, as it has to act in close col- 
laboration with the Commission and the Member States to promote the 
necessary coherence in the risk communication process.'09 It may be 
questioned whether the Authority wil! be able to carry out this task 
independently. It should therefore be considered whether more powers 
of risk management should be delegated to the EFSA, combined with 
more political control.
It is clear that an interdisciplinary approach should be adopted to 
tackle all these and other issues. For lawyers, this implies the task of 
developing or redesigning the institutional structures, thus, giving form 
to innovative approaches to food safety, and risk more generally. One of 
the up-coming challenges will be to apply general principles and new 
instruments of governance to both risk assessment and risk manage­
ment. In this lecture, I have tried to give you examples of some such 
challenges.
To come back to our first questions: it is still safe to eat farmed 
salmon? Should we believe the American or the European scientists? I 
have tried to show you the complexities that are involved in answering 
these questions. Much will depend on the confidence we have in our 
European food safety authorities. The credibility of these authorities, in 
turn, will depend, in part, on the level of transparency of their activities, 
to what extent they involve the stakeholders in their activities and the 
way in which they communicate the process and results of such activi­
ties to the general public.
108 D. Chalmers, supra note 55, p. 549.
109 Article 40(3) of Regulation (EC) No 178/2002, supra note 64.
Overcoming the Crisis of Confidence
5 Dankwoord
Mijnheer de Rector Magnificus, zeer gewaardeerde toehoorders,
ik ben aan het eind van mijn rede gekomen.
Ik dank het College van Bestuur van deze Universiteit en het Bestuur 
van de Faculteit der Rechtsgeleerdheid voor het in mij gestelde vertrou­
wen. Ik ben bijzondere dank verschuldigd aan de voormalige 
rector Prof. Arie Nieuwenhuijzen Kruseman en de voormalige voorzitter 
Dr. Karl Dittrich. Hun steun en vertrouwen hebben bijzonder veel voor 
mij betekend.
\
Graag bedank ik vanaf deze plaats mijn bronnen van inspiratie en 
motivatie, Ewoud Hondius, Dieter Hoffmann, de heer Kapteyn, René 
Barents en mijn promotoren Christian Joerges en Renaud Dehousse. Ik 
ben hen zeer erkentelijk voor wat zij mij hebben geleerd en voor de 
unieke kansen die zij mij hebben geboden. Zonder hen had ik hier van­
daag niet gestaan.
Collega’s van de rechtenfaculteit en in het bijzonder de collega's van 
de capaciteitsgroep internationaal en Europees recht, ik wil ju llie  harte­
lijk danken voor jullie  welkom, advies en ondersteuning. Ik heb me vanaf 
het begin direct al aan deze faculteit thuis gevoeld. Dit kwam vooral 
door jullie hartelijke ontvangst. Daarnaast riepen natuurlijk ook de zui­
delijke atmosfeer van Maastricht en de zondagse flaneerparades van de 
Maastrichtenaren in het centrum, warme herinneringen aan Florence 
op. Tevens hebben onze Maastrichtse en de MIC studenten hiertoe bij­
gedragen. Met trots kan ik zeggen dat recentelijk de European Law 
School als beste rechtenopleiding in Nederland is gekwalificeerd door 
de Keuzegids Hoger Onderwijs. De MIC studenten met al hun verschil­
lende nationaliteiten en culturen betekenen een enorme verrijking voor 
het onderwijs en geven meer kleur aan de dagelijkse beslommeringen.
Graag wil ik enkele personen nog apart noemen.
Bruno de Witte en Veerle Deckmyn, ik wil jullie bedanken voor jullie 
steun en vriendschap. Bruno: je bent een groot voorbeeld voor mij. Ik zal 
mijn uiterste best doen een waardig opvolger van je te zijn, hetgeen niet 
gemakkelijk is. Hopelijk zullen we in de toekomst weer naaste collega's 
zijn.
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Hildegard Schneider en René de Groot, ik wil jullie danken voor alle 
warmte en hartelijkheid. Het is een voorrecht om jullie als collega's en 
vrienden te hebben. Hildegard: ik bewonder zowel je tomeloze energie 
(altijd op zoek naar nieuwe uitdagingen) als de professionaliteit waar­
mee je me in het ziekenhuis in de rolstoel voortduwde.
Michael Faure, graag wil ik je bedanken voor je steun, je vertrouwen 
en je humor. Het is een genoegen om met je samen te werken en ik ver­
heug me zeer op onze toekomstige gezamelijke projecten.
Peter Van den Bossche, het is een groot plezier om met je samen te 
werken als co-directeur van het MIC programma. Ik waardeer niet alleen 
je wetenschappelijke en bestuurlijke kwaliteiten maar ook je kwalitei­
ten als huisschilder en verhuizer!
Tot slot wil ik vrienden en familie bedanken voordevelediscussies.de 
gezelligheid, de warmte en hun aanwezigheid hier vandaag. Vorrei rin- 
graziare di cuore la mia famiglia italiana, qui presente. Bovenal wil ik 
mijn moeder Adrie en mijn beide zussen Yvonne en Marga bedanken 
voor de wijze waarop zij mij gedurende de afgelopen jaren hebben 
gesteund. Menig verhuisdoos is door jullie  uitgepakt. Jullie opgewekt­
heid en kracht dienen mij tot voorbeeld.
Mimmo, vorrei ringraziarti per il tuo sostegno ed amore in tutti 
questi anni. A te dedico questa orazione.
Ik heb gezegd.
